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Abstract—With the new industrial revolution of digital trans-
formation, more intelligence and autonomous systems can be
adopted in the manufacturing transportation processes. Safety
and security of autonomous vehicles (AV) have obvious advan-
tages of reducing accidents and maintaining a cautious environ-
ment to drivers and pedestrians. Therefore, the transformation to
data-driven vehicles is associated with the concept of digital twin,
especially within the context of autonomous vehicle design. This
also raises the need to adopt new safety designs to increase the
resiliency and security of the whole autonomous vehicle system.
To enable secure autonomous systems for smart manufacturing
transportation in an end-to-end fashion, this article presents the
main challenges and solutions considering safety and security
functions. This article aims to identify a standard framework
for vehicular digital twins that facilitate data collection, data
processing, and analytics phases. To demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed approach, a case study for vehicle follower model
is analyzed when radar sensor measurements are manipulated in
an attempt to cause a collision. Perceptive findings of this article
can pave the way for future research aspects related to employing
digital twins in the autonomous vehicle industry.
INTRODUCTION
C
URRENTLY the automotive industry is undergoing dra-
matic changes with some major automotive companies
finding themselves lagging behind relatively new software
versions from software companies. The advancement and
expanded usage of digitized technologies in the manufacturing
sector is transforming every department in the automotive
manufacturing chain, from design and product innovation to
consumer and services. The industry is expected to continue
massive growth in connected topology bypassing 50 billion
machines in 2020 and beyond [1]. This causes a massive
increase in data processing in autonomous vehicle (AV) plat-
forms and supporting infrastructure within the category of
Internet of Things (IoT). These segregated and distributed
connectivity models pose a strong threat to vehicular manu-
facturing business and society due to vulnerability to hackers
[2]. Therefore, automobile industry stakeholders including
auto makers and information technology companies must fully
understand the extent in which networks and data management
systems are susceptible to cyber threats, secondly, what steps
need to be taken to close the gaps in the data privacy aspect to
secure car platforms. However, assessing the operational be-
havior and data breaches for smart cars in search for anomaly
events could be very challenging when conducted by humans.
Therefore, there is a big motivation by industry to study the
impacts of cyber attacks in automotive manufacturing and de-
velop new platform solutions for autonomous vehicles featur-
ing safety, security, and data privacy [3]. This objective can be
achieved by developing innovative data protection techniques
when capturing data and during decision making procedures.
IPC-2551 is considered to be the first ‘International Standard
for Digital Twins’ that defines digital twin properties, types
and complexities for digital twin product, architecture, and
lifecycle framework [4]. Moreover, the concept of digital twin
driven safety environment has been used by IoT in virtual
representation of vehicle status transitions for platform health
monitoring [5]. From this definition, it is evident that digital
twins play a crucial role in promoting the visibility of opera-
tions and predictions of future machine safety. Similarly, the
concept of digital twin is critical for data analytics to identify
the situations when data irregularity starts to detach the virtual
representations from physical reality. Digital twin in IoT also
serves in connecting the autonomous vehicles [6] with the
manufactures, thereby, helping business people to make crucial
decisions in the supply chain and inventory management. The
digital twin approach of autonomous vehicles is, therefore, a
business tool and a credible technological asset.This approach
helps to drive the autonomous vehicle industry as with each
vehicle software update, a vehicle becomes slightly closer to
the next level of autonomy.
The architecture of an autonomous vehicle can be divided
into five categories: Perception, which is the process of sensing
the surrounding environment using on-board sensors such
as light detection and ranging (LIDAR), cameras and radio
detection and ranging (RADAR). Localization, which finds
the position of the vehicle using different techniques available.
Planning, which determines the actions that will be carried by
the self-driving platform based on perception and localization.
Control is in charge of execute the actions determined by
the planning,such as breaking, accelerating and steer the
vehicle and finally, system management, which is in charge
of supervise all the other categories, such as log recording,
fault detection and provide a human-machine interface (HMI)
in order to perform basic operations with the Advanced Driver
Assistance Systems (ADAS) [7]. However, a complete profile
for autonomous vehicle testing methodologies is still highly
needed during the whole development process, including func-
tions, system integration, verification, and validation. Thus,
digital twins can be considered as a good virtual environment
for testing ADAS and automated driving systems are good
references for autonomous driving tests.
In the digital twin scenario, there are four different phases
in the automotive industry where data are being exchanged, as
shown in Fig. 1. In the initial phase, the autonomous car starts
collecting different data such as manufacturing data, drivers
perception data, and data that could connect the car to external
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Fig. 1: Digital twin components supporting vehicle autonomy.
systems and services. In the operational driving phase, an
autonomous car collects sensor data from different operational
properties, environmental information, and official reports. In
the analytics phase, the digital twin of an autonomous vehicle
takes a decision automatically based on the collected and
measured data. In the reporting phase, the decision taken
should suggest how to improve the driving procedures that
might affect the driver, which engineers should be able to
control. The stakeholders then receive the reports that are
manually created for further considerations. As we live in
the fourth industrial revolution, more automation should be
involved in the business processes. In this case, the digital twin
may be able to generate automated decision-making reports
that can be sent to the stakeholders. This article aims to study
the impacts of safety and security concerns of digital twin
scenarios for automotive manufacturing. The main objective is
to investigate the current industry market and research about
digital twin technology and data flow in such autonomous
vehicles. Moreover, developing new framework solutions con-
sidering the stranded of safety and security. These objectives
will be attained by introducing innovative data protection
techniques including data gathering and operational decisions
to handle any cyber threats and potential vulnerabilities.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the
next section, we discuss the autonomous industrial vehicle
approach. Then, we present a developed safety and security
framework for digital twin information interaction. Following
this, we present a case study using radar sensors for validating
the feasibility of a safety approach for the proposed model in
context of reliability. Finally, we conclude this article.
LEVELS OF AUTONOMY AND OPERATIONAL MODELS
For an autonomous vehicle system, there are different levels
of autonomy, as shown in Fig. 2:
• Level 0: This is the manual mode in which the car
operates. The driver has the full control of the vehicle
and there is no autonomous control.
• Level 1: Which is also referred to as the no automation
category. This class is characterized by the driver having
complete control of the main functions of the vehicle.
These tasks include steering, braking, motive powering,
and throttling. The driver is as well responsible for the
vehicle safe operation.
• Level 2: Also known as the function-specific automa-
tion level. In this operational model, the manufacturer
automates one or more control functions in the vehicle
[8]. The person driving the vehicle assumes the overall
control and safe operation of the automobile. However,
the driver can opt to relinquish limited authority over
some functions such as electronic stability and dynamic
braking during emergencies.
• Level 3: Which is also known as combined-function
automation. Computerization in this category entails at
least two primary functions. These controls should work
in harmony to relieve the driver and allow him or her to
perform other tasks. Even though he or she is still liable
for the safe operation of the vehicle and monitoring the
roadway, autonomous vehicle systems with this level of
automation allow the driver to leave control over some
primary control functions [8]. However, the motorist
should be ready to act without warning at all times.
• Level 4: automation, also referred to as the limited self-
driving level, describes the capability that allows the
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driver to surrender full control of all functions considered
to be crucial for safety under particular environmen-
tal and traffic situations. In case of any changes, the
automation infrastructure should allow for a safe and
comfortable transition.
• Level 5: Refers to an automation infrastructure that gives
the vehicle full self-driving capabilities. In this opera-
tional model, the manufacturer develops an automobile
that carries out all the driving functions thought to be
vital for the safe operation of the vehicle [9]. The infras-
tructure also enables the vehicle to monitor all roadway
conditions during a full trip. In such circumstances,
the designed vehicle assumes that the driver provides
instructions for both the destination and navigation mech-
anism. Further, the autonomous car can move without
any human intervention. The automated infrastructure is
responsible for the safety of the vehicle operation.
Fig. 2: Autonomy levels in vehicular systems.
DIGITAL TWIN APPROACH
The Digital Twin collects the real-time data from sensors
and correlates the acquired information with historical data
that was obtained earlier from the same car. Based on this
processing, the digital twin can make a decision to alert for any
unsafe environment [10]. The logical data flow in autonomous
cars starts by collecting the data from platform sensors such
as Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR), radar, etc. The
acquired data and events are proceeded within the digital
twin analytics cluster to perform adjustments, suggestion, and
alerts before sending them back to the automotive system.
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) developed a
framework that highlights the industry market requirements
for the development of connected and autonomous vehicles.
A common theme in these requirements is the need for
features that enable the components of the digital twins to
interact directly with the physical autonomous system. The
interaction is attainable through a framework that includes
data, integration, analytics, and digital twin itself as part of
driving system.
In the perspective of autonomous vehicles, a digital twin
refers to the efforts placed in the design and implementation
of processes needed to enhance the safety, security, and
privacy of driverless cars [11]. The acquired data can be
integrated to generate information which, when analyzed, leads
to the generation of an automatic response. The conceptual
architecture in the system is to support the flow of large
amounts of data at high speeds. Any delayed speed of data
reception, algorithmic analysis, and response may cause car
crashes, which may result in fatalities. Therefore, automotive
manufacturing should ensure that models and components
used for digital twin deployments provide the anticipated
safety and security features in optimal order. Since most of
the data used by autonomous vehicles are frequently captured
in the image format, it is necessary to have an instrument that
captures a high level of image diversity including elements
such as the sensor or radar. These details are obtainable
through the integration of the data collected from global posi-
tioning systems (GPS), cameras, radar, and infrared sources
such as LIDAR techniques [12]. The gadgets should have
advanced environmental recognition capabilities as they are
crucial for planning, decision making, and safe operations in
autonomous vehicles. The other industry market requirement
is a highly sensitive tool for capturing data. There are a number
of challenges involved in autonomous driving which are still
not solved. One of them is the sensor, which needs to detect
and analyze the vast amount of environmental information for
decision making. With more data, there is more unnecessary
data that needs to be tuned out.
SYSTEM INTEGRITY OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
As stakeholders continue to promote the development of
AV, they must also take into consideration the immeasurable
outcomes that may arise if there are miscalculations. One
issue of concern for self-driving cars is safety and security. As
the digital twin becomes an inseparable feature in driverless
systems, the risks of becoming a top target for malicious
hackers and cybercriminals are of considerable concern.
Cybersecurity challenges should be considered during all
development and deployment phases of any autonomous
car, regardless the level of supported autonomy. The need
for cybersecurity features arises from the fact that various
types of sensors in vehicle platforms could be the entry
points for any cyber-attack. The consequent impacts of a
successful hacking would impact the autonomous vehicles
safety involving mechanical, electrical and electronic systems.
Such unexpected failures may cause catastrophic impacts
that could be harmful to human life, vehicle, and environment.
Vulnerabilities of Autonomous Vehicles: In relations to se-
curity, autonomous vehicles are vulnerable to cyber-attacks in
many ways. The first type of vulnerability relates to the fact
that digital twins are hosted by cloud computing, which means
that network components are virtualized on remote servers
to process storage, retrieve, and store data. Those servers are
stocked by 3rd party cloud service providers that offer scalable
computational resources. Within the Internet of things context,
autonomous vehicles possess a large amount of data that is
exchanged with the network and normally stored in cloud.
Most of the exchanged data include navigational informa-
tion about the surrounding landscape and predicated routes
for vehicles to follow in congested zones. Such information
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is quite sensitive to the safety of vehicular platforms and
communication systems. Therefore, any vulnerability in those
systems could cause catastrophic sequences, especially when
identified by hackers. The other form of vulnerability arises
from the growing use of multiple programming languages
from open source without enough validations and trails by
supply chains. Therefore, automakers should consider vali-
dating software operational systems and align them with car
parts for compatibility and tractability. This process will allow
to identify vulnerability occurrence during production cycle
and afterwards during upgrades and maintenance. Hackers
may only take advantage of a component that has been
programmed by an inferior coding language to penetrate
the entire automated system. The third type of vulnerability
experienced in autonomous cars concerns the blending of
technologies and resources. Car manufacturers are competing
among themselves to deliver the first autonomous vehicle. The
heightened competition has discouraged them from sharing
resources and technologies to develop a refined and secure
model. These limitations may give hackers the chance to
manipulate the vehicles in the future as firms are not willing
to share ideas on safeguarding the cars.
Fig. 3: Safety and security tree in autonomous vehicles.
Types of Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles: Self-driving vehi-
cles are susceptible to attacks because they have to communi-
cate with other cars and software and hardware infrastructure
that are connected to external networks. There are several areas
of attacks of autonomous vehicle systems: sensors, vehicular
ad-hoc network (VANET) [6], and hardware.
1) Sensors attacks: These attacks may occur if hackers
manipulate the sensors installed on the vehicles. The
first instance of attack may take place on the global po-
sitioning system, which helps in locating and navigating
the car.
2) VANET attacks:These attacks occur on the internal and
external networks. An example of an attack on the
internal network is the key or passcode attack. Users
use passwords and keys to secure their vehicles. A
hacker may use a method such as brute force to ob-
tain these passwrodes and keys. A vehicle-to-everything
(V2X) attack on the external network manipulates the
smartphone or any other gadget that helps the car to
communicate with the cloud through Bluetooth, Wi-Fi,
or the global system for mobile (GSM) communications.
Distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack occurs
when a hacker manipulates a functioning system by
using either a single or multiple attacking devices. A
hacker can perform a DDOS attack by overpowering
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication, the automated
infrastructure, or a single network.
3) GPS spoofing attacks: A spoofing attack usually involves
unauthorized terminals gaining access to a computer
network and pretending to be a legitimate terminal in the
compromised network by falsifying data. The approach
enables the attacker to receive valid data illegitimately
from the network and can be used to access other parts
of the system or even cause significant damage to the
compromised systems. In the context of GPS spoofing
attacks, an attacker deceives a GPS receiver through
broadcasting stronger as well as slightly different GPS
signals. An autonomous vehicle using GPS for navi-
gation then interprets the received signals as a set of
normal location data. Spoofing enables the attacker to
gain control of the autonomous vehicle because he or
she has the ability to control the car by transmitting
false information that the car uses for control.
SAFETY AND SECURITY PLATFORM MODEL
The autonomous vehicles involve complex engineering and
computing platforms with wireless access to the cloud. There-
fore, manufacturers deploy embedded computing technologies
in these vehicles to ensure that they operate effectively and
efficiently in the physical environment. During manufacturing,
operation, and maintenance phases, the AV stakeholders in-
cluding manufacturers, users, regulators, fellow motorists, and
technology companies should have predesigned solutions to is-
sues of security and safety. The alignment process will use two
sets of international standards: The Society of Automotive En-
gineers (SAE) SAE J3061 and the International Organization
for Standardizations (ISO) ISO 26262 [13]. The former defines
cybersecurity measures for conventional automobiles, whereas
the latter defines the electrical and electronic (E/E) safety for
car platforms. SAE J3061 addresses issues of security, while
ISO 26262 deals with matters of safety. The SAE J3061 stan-
dard [14] recommends a mechanism for combining security
and safety processes by creating communication links between
cybersecurity and safety activities such as threat analysis and
risk assessment, hazard analysis and risk assessment, safety
requirements, and security requirements. The two concepts
should be aligned in the design and development stage of self-
driving cars to make sure that the autonomous vehicle attains
the necessary level of protection. Since there are five to six
possible levels of automation in self-driving cars, the security
and safety of these autonomous vehicles are dependent on the
environmental conditions and automation levels.
The developed framework is proposed to analyze safety and
security concerns in autonomous vehicle systems, as shown
in Fig. 4. The steps approach is appropriate for modeling
and analyzing aspects of safety and security in digital twin
systems. The new model comprises the six elements of the
autonomous system: safety countermeasures, failures, func-
tions, security countermeasures, cyberattacks, and digital twin.
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Fig. 4: Data twin proposed framework for vehicle safety and security.
It utilizes correlational matrices to demonstrate interdependen-
cies between those elements. System analytics may be used
to evaluate security and safety aspects by applying process
functions and digital twins to better understand the impact
of attacks and failures on the automated system. The first
step of the framework is for checking safety and security,
which is meant to model the functional hierarchy of the
autonomous car. Functional objectives will be created and
then specifying the functions and sub-functions required to
realize the goal. The correlational matrix utilized to express
the relationship between functions that can be low, moderate,
or high. In the second stage, the digital twin explains the
systems structure as a compendium of units and subsystems. A
system analyst then assigns a particular relationship matrix to
define the association between the functions and digital twin.
In regard to the operations of AV, steps one and two entail the
definition of the driving functions and systems or infrastructure
of self-driving cars at the design and development stages. The
functional and digital twin aspects of the autonomous vehicles
are expressed and included in the model together with their
relationships. Structural elements such as the installation of
actuators and engine control units are included in this phase.
Next phase is focused on performing analysis on safety haz-
ards. The analyst determines any failures and includes them to
the model. He or she will then identify the correlation among
the functions, failures, and system structure and assign them a
matrix. Then, analysis of security threats should be performed.
The analyst or operator identifies all possible attacks and
includes them on the model. Relationship matrices to express
the interdependence among the attacks, structure, functions,
and failures are then specified. This description, for instance,
will designate an attack-failure matrix to establish the failures
that may occur as a result of a successful attack. The last
two stated steps are essential for addressing the vulnerabilities
associated with autonomous cars. In terms of safety, a hazard
analysis and risk assessment are performed to help with the
identification and evaluation of possible hazardous and events.
This assessment also assists with the expression of functional
safety requirements in driverless vehicles.
Elements such as hazard, situation, and fault are utilized
to ensure that all hazards relating to self-driving are catered
for during development. After performing hazard analysis, the
failures that have been taken into account in the security re-
quirements are removed from the fault sequences and included
on the developed framework. In terms of security, a threat anal-
ysis and risk assessment are performed to gauge the security
6
Fig. 5: Safety based detection radar sensor of vehicle follower model.
threats and deduce the functional security requirements of the
autonomous vehicle. The dimensions expressed in the earlier
stages can be utilized to define the attack initiation and create
information-flow frameworks to assist in the identification of
potential attacks. After that, the system analyst incorporates
the safety countermeasures to the framework and defines the
relationships. Finally, the analyst includes the security coun-
termeasures on the model and determines their relationships.
Particular matrices will be assigned to describe the relationship
of attack and failures and their security countermeasures and
the correlations between security and safety. In the last two
steps performed, the security and safety countermeasures are
specified and included to the model alongside their relation-
ships. In terms of safety, the safety requirements are enhanced
by designing and developing countermeasures to fulfill them.
The same process is performed on the security aspect such
that security countermeasures are developed to fulfill their
respective requirements. This process is performed for safety
and security alignment as well as for the next two phases
which are AV production and AV operation.
CASE STUDY: VEHICLE SENSOR ATTACK DETECTION
For validation purposes, a case study is developed to
validate the scenario of using radar sensors in the vehicle
follower model and how the collected data can be computed to
identify an attack using digital twin. Data flow framework can
help to highlight the originating sensors and various processes
of system information including data collection, storage and
execution. Typically, data flow frameworks show the whole
path for data in end-to-end fashion starting sources to stor-
age. However, it is necessary to define the detection process
and prevention strategy to identify and prevent unauthorized
access to autonomous vehicle systems. Although there are
various strategies for eliminating the threat of attack or error
in vehicular systems, the choice between those strategies is
subject to regulations, standards, and technical features of
software and hardware systems. Additionally, analytic modules
are used to identify changes in the pipeline bandwidth and
consumed power levels. Those monitoring sensors will trigger
the appropriate alarm to alert the driver about a possible attack
once there is irregularity in the columns of data exchanged
or high-levels of computational power consumption. Tailoring
to our test, the radar sensor can be programmed to trigger
other additional actions such as driving in a predetermined
pattern, activation of manual driving mode, positioning or even
disabling auto-driving to ensure that a compromised car is
unusable to the attacker. In a vehicle follower model, the car
is equipped with an adaptive-cruise control (ACC) system that
will always keep the vehicle on a reasonable path towards
destination [15]. The ACC system built with a millimeter wave
radar sensor to enable measurement of relative distance and
velocity to a previous vehicle (attacker vehicle). The sensor
measuring velocity of the following vehicle is considered as a
trusted value for vehicle follower model and sensor detection
scheme, as shown in Fig. 5. The forward-facing radar sensor
is used for radar range measurements corresponding also to
the longitudinal position of the target vehicle.
The cyber-attack impact is shown in Fig. 6-a, as the indica-
tor reports an inclination in the vehicle direction as measured
by the hacked radar sensor compared with the actual true
direction on ground. This inclination shows that the sensor pro-
vides data that shows closer distance to destination compared
with the real physical location on ground path. The impaired
sensor in this case detects objects in low illumination within
the radar cross-section (RCS) and shows them to be closer to
the vehicle from the actual reality. Assuming accurate sensor
measurements and once the data is transferred to the digital
twin, it will mismatch the angle measured to the projected
location of the target during azimuthal projection. Typically,
the analytics scheme then refers to the actual measured data
as the reference point for any calculations causing major
disturbances in estimated data and potential accidents when
using such data in automating the vehicle on the road.
Fig. 6-b shows the lateral position errors compared with the
actual ground direction from surrounding objects (e.g. cars).
This causes the digital twin to miss-calculate the availability
of the surrounding lanes on the road and keep the car on a
certain lane assuming no other options are available. Since
the vehicle is not able to change lanes and combined with the
effect of the forwarding collision center impact of Fig. 6-a.
the digital twin will determine to reduce the car speed as it
predicates arrival to destination. This shows that multi-sensor
data need to be aligned in terms of provided measurements to
be adopted by the digital twin, otherwise the analytics should
neglect data from sensors that report incoherent data compared
with other data sources. It also shows that digital twin could
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Fig. 6: Impaired detection data provided by vehicle sensors to
digital twin.
carry the data verification process and classify a data source
to be invalid or hacked considering data values even though
the source of those data is genuine.
CONCLUSION
In this article, digital twin is explored to automate the
decision making process inside an autonomous vehicle using
radar sensor data collected from initial, analytics, and reporting
phases, and generate reports to be sent to autonomous vehicles.
Some of the advantages presented using the car-follower
model bring the benefit of reducing the risk of cyber attack and
accident. The vehicles must transmit, receive, and process data.
Therefore, the stakeholders involved in the development of
autonomous cars should, therefore, pay emphasis on privacy,
safety, and security to enjoy the benefits of these vehicles. The
proposed platform model in this article will help to achieve
this goal by profiling the safety and security concerns and
addressing them with their respective countermeasures. The
recommended model aims at identifying, analyzing, and as-
sessing the threats and providing the user with an opportunity
to take appropriate countermeasures in ensuring safety and
security using digital twins in driverless vehicles.
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